What BATNAs Are
BATNA is a term coined by Roger Fisher and William Ury in their 1981 bestseller, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Without Giving In.[1] It stands for \u201cBest ALTERNATIVE TO a negotiated agreement.\u201d Said another way, it is the best you can do if the other person refuses to negotiate with you\u2013if they tell you to \u201cgo jump in a lake!\u201d or \u201cGet lost!\u201d So it is not necessarily your ideal outcome\u2013unless your ideal outcome is something you can get without the cooperation of the other person. It is the best you can do WITHOUT THEM.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
BATNAs are critical to negotiation because you cannot make a wise decision about whether to accept a negotiated agreement unless you know what your alternatives are. If you are offered a used car for $7,500, but there\u2019s an even better one at another dealer for $6,500\u2013the $6,500 car is your BATNA. Another term for the same thing is your \u201cwalk away point.\u201d If the seller doesn\u2019t drop her price below $6,500, you will WALK AWAY and buy the other car.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Your BATNA \u201cis the only standard which can protect you both from accepting terms that are too unfavorable and from rejecting terms it would be in your interest to accept.\u201d[2] In the simplest terms, if the proposed agreement is better than your BATNA, then you should accept it. If the agreement is not better than your BATNA, then you should reopen negotiations. If you cannot improve the agreement, then you should at least consider withdrawing from the negotiations and pursuing your alternative (though the relational costs of doing that must be considered as well).<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Having a good BATNA increases your negotiating power. If you know you have a good alternative, you do not need to concede as much, because you don\u2019t care as much if you get a deal. You can also push the other side harder. If your options are slim or non existent, the other person can make increasing demands, and you\u2019ll likely decide to accept them\u2013because you don\u2019t have a better option, no matter how unattractive the one on the table is becoming. Therefore, it is important to improve your BATNA whenever possible. If you have a strong one, it is worth revealing it to your opponent. If you have a weak one, however, it is better to keep that detail hidden.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
\u201cThe reason you negotiate is to produce something better than the results you can obtain without negotiating. What are those results? What is that alternative? What is your BATNA \u2014 your Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement? That is the standard against which any proposed agreement should be measured.\u201d \u2014 Roger Fisher and William Ury
Guy Burgess and Heidi Burgess have adapted the concept of BATNA slightly to emphasize what they call \u201cEATNAs\u201d\u2013 estimated alternatives to a negotiated agreement\u201d instead of \u201cbest alternatives.\u201d Even when disputants do not have good options outside of negotiations, they often think they do. (For example, both sides may think that they can prevail in a court or military struggle, even when one side is clearly weaker, or when the relative strengths are so balanced that the outcome is very uncertain.) Yet, perceptions are all that matter when it comes to deciding whether or not to accept an agreement. If a disputant thinks that he or she has a better option, she will, very often, pursue that option, even if it is not as good as she thinks it is.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
BATNA and EATNAs also affect what William Zartman and may others have called \u201cripeness,\u201d the time at which a dispute is ready or \u201cripe\u201d for settlement.[3] When parties have similar ideas or \u201ccongruent images\u201d about what BATNAs exist, then the negotiation is ripe for reaching agreement. Having congruent BATNA images means that both parties have similar views of how a dispute will turn out if they do not agree, but rather pursue their other rights-based or power-based options. In this situation, it is often smarter for them to negotiate an agreement without continuing the disputing process, thus saving the transaction costs. This is what happens when disputing parties who are involved in a lawsuit settle out of court, (which happens in the U.S. about 90 percent of the time). The reason the parties settle is that their lawyers have come to an understanding of the strength of each sides\u2019 case and how likely each is to prevail in court. They then can \u201ccut to the chase,\u201d and get to the same result much more easily, more quickly, and less expensively through negotiation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
On the other hand, disputants may hold \u201cdissimilar images\u201d about what BATNAs exist, which can lead to a stalemate or even to intractability. For example, both sides may think they can win a dispute if they decide to pursue it in court or through force. If both sides\u2019 BATNAs tell them they can pursue the conflict and win, the likely result is a power contest. If one side\u2019s BATNA is indeed much better than the other\u2019s, the side with the better BATNA is likely to prevail. If the BATNAs are about equal, however, the outcome is much less certain. If the conflict is costly enough, eventually the parties may come to realize that their BATNAs were not as good as they thought they were. Then the dispute will again be \u201cripe\u201d for negotiation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The allure of the EATNA often leads to last-minute breakdowns in negotiations, particularly when many parties are involved. Disputants can negotiate for months or even years, finally developing an agreement that they think is acceptable to all. But then at the end, all the parties must take a hard look at the final outcome and decide, \u201cis this better than all of my alternatives?\u201d Only if all the parties say \u201cyes,\u201d can the agreement be finalized. If just one party changes his or her mind, the agreement may well break down. Thus, knowing one\u2019s own and one\u2019s opponents\u2019 BATNAs and EATNAs is critical to successful negotiation<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Determining Your BATNA<\/p>\n\n\n\n
BATNAs are not always readily apparent. Fisher and Ury outline a simple process for determining your BATNA:BATNA\u5e76\u4e0d\u603b\u662f\u663e\u800c\u6613\u89c1\u7684\u3002Fisher\u548cUry\u6982\u8ff0\u4e86\u786e\u5b9aBATNA\u7684\u7b80\u5355\u8fc7\u7a0b\uff1a<\/p>\n\n\n\n
1\u3001develop a list of actions you might conceivably take if no agreement is reached;\u5236\u5b9a\u4e00\u4efd\u5982\u679c\u672a\u8fbe\u6210\u534f\u8bae\u53ef\u80fd\u4f1a\u91c7\u53d6\u7684\u884c\u52a8\u6e05\u5355;
2\u3001improve some of the more promising ideas and convert them into practical options; \u6539\u8fdb\u4e00\u4e9b\u66f4\u6709\u5e0c\u671b\u7684\u60f3\u6cd5\u5e76\u5c06\u5176\u8f6c\u5316\u4e3a\u5b9e\u9645\u9009\u62e9; \u548c\u9879\u76ee\u53c2\u4e0e\u8005\u63d0\u4f9b\u4e86 \u5bf9BATNA\u7684\u66f4\u591a\u89c1\u89e3\u3002
3\u3001select, tentatively, the one option that seems best.\u6682\u65f6\u9009\u62e9\u6700\u597d\u7684\u9009\u9879\u3002<\/p>\n\n\n\n
BATNAs may be determined for any negotiation situation, whether it be a relatively simple task such as finding a job or a complex problem such as a heated environmental conflict or a protracted ethnic conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
select, tentatively, the one option that seems best.[4]
BATNAs may be determined for any negotiation situation, whether it be a relatively simple task such as finding a job or a complex problem such as a heated environmental conflict or a protracted ethnic conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Fisher and Ury offer a job search as a basic example of how to determine a BATNA. If you do not receive an attractive job offer by the end of the month from Company X, what will you do? Inventing options is the first step to determining your BATNA. Should you take a different job? Look in another city? Go back to school? If the offer you are waiting for is in New York, but you had also considered Denver, then try to turn that other interest into a job offer there, too. With a job offer on the table in Denver, you will be better equipped to assess the New York offer when it is made. Lastly, you must choose your best alternative option in case you do not reach an agreement with the New York company. Which of your realistic options would you really want to pursue if you do not get the job offer in New York?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
More complex situations require the consideration of a broader range of factors and possibilities. For example, a community discovers that its water is being polluted by the discharges of a nearby factory. Community leaders first attempt to negotiate a cleanup plan with the company, but the business refuses to voluntarily agree on a plan of action that the community is satisfied with. In such a case, what are the community\u2019s options for trying to resolve this situation?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
They could possibly sue the business based on stipulations of the Clean Water Act.
They could contact the Environmental Protection Agency and see what sort of authority that agency has over such a situation.
They could lobby the state legislature to develop and implement more stringent regulations on polluting factories.
The community could wage a public education campaign and inform citizens of the problem. Such education could lead voters to support more environmentally-minded candidates in the future who would support new laws to correct problems like this one. It might also put enough public pressure on the company that it would change its mind and clean up voluntarily.
In weighing these various alternatives to see which is \u201cbest,\u201d the community members must consider a variety of factors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Which is most affordable and feasible?
Which will have the most impact in the shortest amount of time?
If they succeed in closing down the plant, how many people will lose their jobs?
These types of questions must be answered for each alternative before a BATNA can be determined in a complex environmental dispute such as this one.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
BATNAs and the Other Side
At the same time you are determining your BATNA, you should also consider the alternatives available to the other side. Sometimes they may be overly optimistic about what their options are. The more you can learn about their options, the better prepared you will be for negotiation. You will be able to develop a more realistic view of what the outcomes may be and what offers are reasonable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
There are also a few things to keep in mind about revealing your BATNA to your adversary. Although Fisher and Ury do not advise secrecy in their discussions of BATNAs, according to McCarthy, \u201cone should not reveal one\u2019s BATNA unless it is better than the other side thinks it is.\u201d[5] But since you may not know what the other side thinks, you could reveal more than you should. If your BATNA turns out to be worse than the opponent thinks it is. Then revealing it will weaken your stance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
BATNAs and the Role of Third Parties
Third parties can help disputants accurately assess their BATNAs through reality testing and costing. In reality testing, the third party helps clarify and ground each disputing party\u2019s alternatives to agreement. S\/he may do this by asking hard questions about the asserted BATNA: \u201cHow could you do that? What would the outcome be? What would the other side do? How do you know?\u201d Or the third party may simply insert new information into the discussion\u2026illustrating that one side\u2019s assessment of its BATNA is likely incorrect. Costing is a more general approach to the same process\u2026it is a systematic effort to determine the costs and benefits of all options. In so doing, parties will come to understand all their alternatives. If this is done together and the parties agree on the assessment, this provides a strong basis upon which to come up with a negotiated solution that is better than both sides\u2019 alternatives. But if the sides cannot come to such an agreement, then negotiations will break down, and both parties will pursue their BATNA instead of a negotiated outcome.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"